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I. INTRODUCTION
Peter M. Gerhart takes on the ambitious project of articulating a
unified theory of property in his book Property Law and Social Moral-
ity.  He offers descriptive and normative views of the property system
as a social legal organism.1  Central to this vision is his lexicon, which
includes the fundamental concepts of “recognition,” “reflection,”
“morality,” “values,” “equality,” and “community.”  The terms are es-
sential to Gerhart’s development of a narrative about the creation of
property systems and their meaning.  The lexicon is also vital to the
other equally significant component of his project, which is to provide
a framework for individuals and legal institutions (e.g., courts, legisla-
tures, agencies) to make responsible decisions about the resources
that often serve as the focal point for social interaction.
An empowering aspect of Gerhart’s theory is the idea that individu-
als are connected to, rather than alienated from, the property law sys-
tem and that they are instrumental in making and remaking their
system.  If property emerges from the contributions of all members in
society then property can change through those individuals.  Indeed,
the first sentence of his book emphasizes the relationship between
communities and property.  Gerhart writes, “[a] society is known by
its property system because a society’s property system expresses soci-
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law, J.D. Harvard
Law School, Ph.D. Duke University. The author wishes to thank Texas A & M School
of Law for the invitation to participate in the symposium on Professor Gerhart’s
book, Property Law and Social Morality.
1. Organism refers to: “Any complex thing or system having properties and func-
tions determined not only by the properties and relations of its individual parts, but
by the character of the whole that they compose and by the relations of the parts to
the whole.” Organism Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/organism (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). Gerhart defines his project as “propos-
ing a theory that identifies the factors society uses, and ought to use, to institutional-
ize structured decisions about society’s resources.” PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY
LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 6 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
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ety’s values about the distribution and use of its resources.”2  As par-
ticipants in society, individuals have responsibilities regarding how
they act toward one another and in making decisions about how their
world is ordered.  Gerhart not only seeks to highlight the interconnec-
tions between people working together to decide how they want to
live and structure the access to and use of resources available to them,
he also seeks to mitigate the potential for decisions that threaten the
legitimacy of the system and its stability.  Those decisions are concern-
ing because they do not adequately take into account the relevant in-
terests that are implicated in the use of a resource.  Developing a
framework that allows for a fuller consideration of a range of interests
and outcomes is a commendable but challenging goal.
This Article focuses on the meaning of the system Gerhart describes
by unpacking some of the conclusions he draws regarding legitimacy,
cooperation, and morality.  The Article also evaluates the framework
he proposes for achieving decisions that are “fair and efficient.”3  The
Article concludes that Gerhart’s theory significantly advances the pro-
ject of incorporating equalizing concepts into property law which
should result in decisions that are more equitable from a participatory
and distributive perspective.  However, there are aspects of the theory
that do not capture the discordant elements of property systems and
that do not unearth the inequalities at the root of the systems’ begin-
nings that are often replicated over time.
II. THE BEGINNINGS OF A PROPERTY SYSTEM
This Section explores Gerhart’s explication of how property rights
come into being as a prelude to analyzing assumptions his theory
makes about legitimacy and coercion.  Gerhart states that he is “ag-
nostic” about the initiatory moments of a property system.4  Instead,
what matters is the system that has been created.  Nonetheless, he of-
fers a narrative about how property rights come into being that takes
into account theories that alternatively posit the state (i.e. govern-
ment) as the origin of property and that posit nature as the origin.5
2.  Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 21.
4. Id. at 315. Gerhart writes:
“The theory here is agnostic about starting points because the theory sug-
gests that cooperation depends on the creation of shared belief systems, and
shared belief systems can form around claims to resources, whether those
claims are made by individuals or by the state.”
Id. This Article agrees with the latter idea about the existence of a formal political
entity not being required for “shared belief systems . . . [to] form around claims to
resources.” However, there is more to the question of beginnings than a theory of
where rights come from. There are issues of power at play that need to be explored.
These issues render suspect whether there is a shared belief system that can be
pointed to as a sign of the cooperative nature of property law.
5. Id. at 48 (“[T]he evolutionary mechanism by which owners make claims and
the community accepts or rejects the claims is at work whether we view property
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This narrative is essential for explaining an ongoing dynamic process
that is at the heart of his theory.  The process entails the exchanges
between a pre-legal moment and the legal realm of property law.6  In
the pre-legal moment, individuals make decisions about resources
(e.g., ownership, how they will be used, divided, etc.).  If those deci-
sions gain acceptance from the community they form customary prac-
tices, offering guidance for the future.7  Owners are recognized as
having ownership over certain resources and those resources are rec-
ognized as property with restrictions on use and access.  Over time,
the legal system absorbs the customary practices translating them into
legal rules and laws.8  The legal system, however, is not passive in the
process.  Courts and other legal institutions, such as the legislature
and agencies, may modify and replace the customary rules and prac-
tices.  The “translated” rules then bind the community.  This is the
property organism that Gerhart’s work describes.  The narrative is
rich in its account of property rights because of what the representa-
tion highlights—individuals engaged in the act of finding ways to work
together to build a stable social order and a legal system that is cogni-
zant of solutions offered by individuals within society and that takes
those solutions into account in formulating legal rules.  The commu-
nity contribution element is especially important because Gerhart
wishes to underscore the “social construction” of the property system.
From the classics of property case law9 and even in international
law,10 one can identify examples that support Gerhart’s vision of the
rise of property rights.  While this narrative is useful in giving form to
the exchanges that occur between people regarding resources in creat-
ing a system, it ignores aspects of what may have transpired at the
early stages that have  relevance for those interpreting the meaning of
an established system.11
Gerhart’s choice to start from an existing property system is a stra-
tegic move.  This strategy allows him to make numerous assumptions
upon which he builds his theory.  By not focusing on property’s ori-
gins, Gerhart can concentrate on his main concerns, which are exam-
ining how the system operates and making recommendations for how
it should operate.  Gerhart’s approach, however, prompts questions
rights as being derived from the sovereign or as arising spontaneously from the state
of nature.”).
6. Id. at 49 (“[T]he shape and content of rights are constantly in flux. . . .”).
7. GERHART, supra note 1, at 152–53.
8. Id.
9. See e.g., Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (the court adheres to customs
involving whaling and ownership rights).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) (“Customary law results from a general and consistent prac-
tice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).
11. See Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J.
1287 (2014). See also Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Pro-
gressive Property, 101 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 107 (2013).
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about his claims concerning the moral aspect of property laws and of
property’s participatory nature.  If one focuses on the United States,
an examination of the beginnings would reveal the wars, conflicts,
power struggles, and protests that occurred.  There is academic litera-
ture to support the connection between those early conflicts over re-
sources and the manifestation of current-day inequalities.12  Rather
than according sufficient attention to the role of power in the con-
struction of a property system, Gerhart’s vision privileges those defin-
able moments in which ownership rights over various resources have
been solidified.  He concentrates on those instances to develop his
theory.  According to Gerhart’s narrative, individuals battle with
other individuals and the state over resources, moving through a series
of renegotiations, producing moments of agreement that harden into
rules, which may be renegotiated at future dates as societal assump-
tions, perspectives, and social mores change.  Gerhart maintains that
once the disputes are settled, signaled by an absence of violence, there
is assent to the property rights as drawn and the decisions should be
respected and adhered to by the formal legal system.  It is Gerhart’s
conclusion regarding assent to the system that needs to be explored
further.  His narrative may work for rationalizing why society and its
institutions should respect, for example, how two farmers negotiated
their boundary disputes or how they determined the values they relied
upon in reaching a resolution, but it may not work for American Indi-
ans attempting to reap the benefits of ownership by conveying title to
land in the late 1700s.13  If one chooses not to consider the beginnings
of property and how the origins  shape the current state of property
rights, then one is leaving untold critical aspects that are relevant to
the conclusions that may be drawn regarding the system’s meaning.
III. SOCIAL RECOGNITION, LEGITIMACY,
COOPERATION, AND COERCION
Recognition and reflection are two essential productive concepts in
Gerhart’s book.  These ideas are intertwined with other recurring
terms that shape his theory.  Both concepts exemplify the paradox of
an individual building and being bound by the legal order that he is
constructing.14  Those conflicting truisms are evident in Gerhart’s use
of the phrase “social recognition.” Social recognition expresses the
idea that “property rights come from and are limited by, the commu-
12. See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(Harper Collins, 2005). These inequalities involve, inter alia, the distribution of prop-
erty along gender, ethnic, and economic lines.
13. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
14. These productive concepts are tools for Gerhart to address a provocative ques-
tion posed by property law scholar Joseph Singer: “‘How can the state both define
property rights and be limited by them?’” GERHART, supra note 1, at 251 (citing Jo-
seph Singer, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1072 (5th ed. 2010).
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nity.”15  Social recognition has several functions in Gerhart’s theory.
It signals cooperation and assent to a legal system.16  Social recogni-
tion also performs constitutive17 and legitimating functions for prop-
erty rights18 and for the decision-making individuals and institutions
(e.g., courts and legislatures) within a legal order.19  Social recognition
validates that the laws of society are “moral.”20  Whether or not the
rights will be socially recognized depends upon the values of society.21
Social recognition grows out of society’s “shared beliefs.”  The ab-
sence of violence is a sign that claims are socially recognized.22
On the foundation of social recognition, Gerhart develops ideas
about the legitimacy, cooperativeness, and morality of the system that
this Article challenges.  The following quote highlights some of the
theory’s key assumptions:
[A]n individual claiming all the resources of the state, and therefore
the right to govern by controlling access to resources of the state,
can do so (without coercion) only so long as the individuals subject
to that control share beliefs about the legitimacy of that exercise of
power. Once those shared beliefs disappear, evolution and revolu-
tion are in the wings.23
There are elements of truth in the foregoing statement to the extent
that it is a comment on a community’s respect for the rule of law.
Individuals may prefer a system in which disputes are channeled into a
nonviolent structure of adjudication as opposed to living in a society
with recurrent outbreaks of violence that leave unclear ownership ti-
tles.  This preference may be signaled by the absence of ongoing vio-
lent uprisings.  However, the absence of overt signs of violence may
be interpreted in several ways.  For Gerhart, the absence of violence is
evidence that what has been designated as property grows out of
“shared beliefs about what makes each person in the exchange better
off and shared beliefs about the appropriate divisions of the gains of
exchange.”24  He advances a theory about individuals, their participa-
15. GERHART, supra note 1, at 250; See also GERHART, supra note 1, at 50
(“[S]ocial recognition is the source of property rights, as well as the source of limita-
tions on property rights. . ..”).
16. Id. at 48–51.
17. Id. at 48 (positing that it is because of social recognition that property rights
“function as rights” and “social recognition determines the scope of the rights”).
18. Id. at 253 (“[P]roperty rights can be defined only by socially recognized
processes using values that the community develops through social interaction.”).
19. Id. at 252 (stating that “social recognition requires that the authority and legit-
imacy of courts and legislatures itself be socially recognized.”).
20. GERHART, supra note 1, at 154–57.
21. Id. at 50 (“[W]e understand the strength of property rights by understanding
the values that shape their recognition.”).
22. Id. at 48 (“Over time, the pre-political community settles on the recognition of
claims that can be made without the threat of renegotiation through violence.”); Id. at
49 (explaining “threats of violence are a substitute for social recognition.”).
23. Id. at 315.
24. Id. at 316.
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tion in society, and their agreement with the decisions about who is
deemed an owner and which resources are appropriately treated as
private property.
This Article critically intervenes to argue that substantial wide-
spread disagreement regarding “what makes each person in [an] ex-
change better off [and] the appropriate divisions of the gains of
exchange” may exist in society even though a revolution has not been
initiated.  An example from the environmental justice25 realm illus-
trates this point.  Lower-income community residents may voice their
objections to the municipality concerning the placement of a hazard-
ous waste landfill within or immediately adjacent to their neighbor-
hood.  The larger community may ignore their voices and disregard
their objections.  The residents may rely upon the legal process (e.g.,
participate in public hearings, appeal local land use decisions in court)
and engage in socially-endorsed forms of petition and protest to re-
solve the land use dispute even though they take issue with the legiti-
macy of the structures and the ultimate outcome (i.e. the decision to
allow Company X to proceed with its plans to dump waste).26  The
absence of an outcry from the majority of the community regarding
the siting of the landfill does not mean that the landfill’s placement
grows out of a “shared belief system” about how to properly allocate
land uses.  The practice of siting hazardous materials may continue on
for years,27 without revolution, but questions would still remain about
the rights of the community in relation to the rights of the property
owner who engages in the dumping of waste.
Coercion exists in systems, even when it is not always apparent.
Distilling the coercive elements within society from the non-coercive
socially agreed upon aspects is difficult, if not impossible.  Coercion is
an implement of power.  As French philosopher Michel Foucault the-
orized, “power is ‘always already there’, . . . one is never ‘outside’ it,
. . . there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system to
gambol in.”28  Coercion exists in many forms.  It does not always in-
25. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY
BACKYARD:  EXECUTIVE ORDER 12898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING EN-
VIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 13 (2003) [hereinafter NOT IN MY BACKYARD] http://
www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf (quoting CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, ADMIN-
ISTRATOR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE (Aug. 9, 2001) http://mde.maryland.gov/programs/ResearchCenter/Report-
sandPublications/GeneralPublications/Documents/www.mde.state.md.us/assets/docu
ment/environmental_justice/ejreport01/ej_2001_Annual_Report_partE.pdf.).
26. See e.g., Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979);
See also NOT IN MY BACKYARD, supra note 25, at 13 (discussing the Bean case).
27. See LUKE W. COLE AND SHELIA R. FOSTER, From the Ground Up: Environ-
mental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement 74–76 (New
York Univ. Press, 2001); See also NOT IN MY BACKYARD, supra note 25, at 13–28.
28. In commenting on government and power, Foucault theorized:
Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the link-
ing of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be
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volve an overt wielding of power by physical violence.  The presence
of a legal system with its institutions, processes, and procedures sig-
nals that there is coercion.  When you are born into a legal system,
you are coerced from the moment you begin making decisions.29  If
you migrate across the borders into another legal system, you are co-
erced even if you do so voluntarily.  That is, you may reject the proce-
dures imposed to legally cross a boundary and view them as unfair,
but you nonetheless comply because you conclude that the benefit in
crossing is greater than the negative effect you will suffer if you depart
from the norm.  Your compliance under protest suggests that you are
coerced in your decision.  If you illegally migrate across the borders,
you will take precautions not to get caught, and in doing so, you rec-
ognize that the territory you are seeking to enter has laws in place that
you are attempting to circumnavigate.  The destination territory is co-
ercing your maneuvers along with the territory that is prompting your
border crossing.  Coercion is always present.  One’s status as a prop-
erty owner or a non-owner is likely to impact how one experiences the
coercive effect. The property owner has advantages that the non-
owner does not.30  Owners have resources to bargain with and the
benefits associated with those resources.31
allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. ‘Gov-
ernment’ did not refer only to political structures or to the management of
states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of
groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communi-
ties, of families, of the sick. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted
forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or
less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibili-
ties of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the
possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to power would
not therefore be sought on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of
voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of
power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike
nor juridical, which is government.
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-
1977 141 (Colin Gordon ed. & et al. trans., 1980); Michel Foucault, Afterword: The
Subject and Power to HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT:
BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS, 208 (2nd ed. 1983). See also Dino
Felluga, Modules on Foucault: On Power, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO CRITICAL THE-
ORY (last updated Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.cla.purdue.edu/english/theory/newhis-
toricism/modules/foucaultpower.html.
29. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977  (Colin Gordon ed. & et al. trans., 1980). See also Fou-
cault: Power is Everywhere, POWERCUBE UNDERSTANDING POWER FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE (last visited Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/
foucault-power-is-everywhere/.
30. The historical beginnings of property systems are relevant to the determina-
tions of owner and non-owner status.
31. The government confers numerous advantages such as tax benefits on owners
in contrast to non-owners. For a discussion of the government policies favoring home-
owners, see generally Edward Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal Bias Towards Home-
ownership, 13 Cityscape: A J. of Policy Dev. and Research (No. 2) 5 (2011).
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Applying Gerhart’s theory, one could conclude that if there are no
obvious signs of coercion, the system is legitimate because, in general,
society adheres to its rules.   Society “recognizes” the decisions.  From
this perspective, obedience may be viewed as confirming social recog-
nition of rules and the legitimacy of property laws.  While this expla-
nation is an insightful account of part of property’s story, it does not
fully address those moments involving the violence it took to establish
a legal system and the force that it takes to maintain it.  Those narra-
tives challenge Gerhart’s characterizations of property systems as co-
operative and moral.  Societies invest many resources to ensure that
there is conformity and cooperation.  Society’s actions of educating
people, inculcating values, and training people to conform to the pre-
vailing rules, involve coercion.32  Obedience may be viewed as a sign
of coercion rather than an absence of it.  The important question here
is: How should one weigh the fact that the coercive effect is always
present against the fact that sometimes people do reach agreements in
society about how to deal with various resources?  One of the many
positives of Gerhart’s theory is that he foregrounds those ongoing oc-
currences of agreement.  His project involves finding ways to improve
the exchanges that individuals have with one another and exchanges
individuals have with the government concerning resources.  He pro-
poses a framework to account for the range of relevant interests in an
exchange and to guide decision makers so that they will “appropri-
ately assign the burdens and benefits.”33
Gerhart’s vision underplays the role and operation of power and
overestimates the ability of non-owners to curb that power by setting
the limits on property rights.34  As an intervention to widen the focus
of his theory, this Article argues that a system’s coercive elements
should always be kept in mind.35  This consideration is necessary even
though the presence of coercion or power can be positive.  Power acts
on people and people exercise power.  At times, individuals simulta-
neously experience situations of being subjected to power and exercis-
ing power.36  If one remains mindful of the influence of coercion, it
will impact the valid conclusions that may be drawn regarding the ex-
32. Regardless of how one views these acts of socialization (e.g., necessary, bad, or
good), it is important to  note the presence of coercion even if there are no apparent
signs of it.
33. GERHART, supra note 1, at 133 (for Gerhart, “the appropriate assignment of
burdens and benefits” is the “essence” of property); Id. at 258.
34. Id. at 48. (“[T]he scope of property rights with respect to particular resources
is determined by the terms under which non-rights-holding members of the commu-
nity recognize them.”).
35. Id. at 316. The book’s lack of emphasis on how coercion works can be ex-
plained by the author’s goals, which include articulating a unifying theory that privi-
leges “shared beliefs” and “cooperation;” see generally id.
36. Gerhart recognizes that duality when discussing the property owner, a power-
ful decision maker who enjoys the freedom to make decisions but who is also con-
strained by society. GERHART, supra note 1, at 62–72.
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istence of a property system that has the roles of owners and non-
owners staked out.  In contrast to Gerhart’s propositions that the
presence of factors constituting property are a sign that the system is
cooperative, formed by shared beliefs and values, and deserving of the
description “moral,” this Article maintains that, even with the sys-
tem’s existing defining elements, there remain questions of legitimacy
and morality.37  To demonstrate this point, the argument herein exam-
ines whether the theory is responsive to all parts of a community,
which include not only the majority but also its more vulnerable
members.
The foregoing discussion emphasizes Gerhart’s pointing to the ab-
sence of overt acts of resistance (e.g., revolution, violent protests) as a
sign of the community’s assent to the values of the system and of soci-
ety’s recognition of its legitimacy.  It is worth exploring further what
counts as signs of resistance and what counts as signs of assent and
legitimacy.  There appears to be an unstated component to Gerhart’s
theory that the majority represents the whole of society.  If the major-
ity fails to object in ways that can be recognized as registering objec-
tion, then it means that individuals “share beliefs about the legitimacy
of the exercise of power.”38  There is no accounting for moments
when minority opposition exists but is stifled. Peaceful protest by a
sizeable minority regarding how resources should be distributed or re-
garding how they have been allocated in the past may be stymied39
just as violent protests may be suppressed.  Governments may quash
expressions of resistance to prevailing values and the distribution of
resources according to those values by relying upon the instruments of
a property law system.  Referencing the United States as an example,
protest movements adhering to the rule of law may be frustrated
through the denial of permits to assemble on property, the govern-
ment’s assertion of zoning regulations, or the placing of other restric-
tions on land use.
IV. REFLECTION, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, AND THE
VEIL OF IGNORANCE
Gerhart develops descriptive and normative aspects of his project
relying upon the concept of reflection.  He positions the owner deci-
37. Section V explores the concept of morality in more depth.
38. GERHART, supra note 1, at 315.  This Article agrees with Gerhart’s insight that
one can interpret a choice to participate in the existing legal system as assent to re-
solve disputes through the system’s structures rather than resorting to physical vio-
lence. However, it is important to distinguish between accepting the rule of law and
accepting the prevailing social values regarding property rights and the distribution of
resources.
39. Consider the various Occupy movements; See Sarah Knuckey, Katherine
Glenn, Emi MacLean, Suppressing Protest: Human Rights Violations in the U.S. Re-
sponse to Occupy Wall Street, PROTEST AND ASSEMBLY HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
(2012).
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sion maker at the center of his theory.40  In doing so, Gerhart is able
to focus on the decision-making process and offer suggestions for the
proper considerations that should inform those decisions.  He devel-
ops a framework according to which an ideal decision maker should
operate in order to arrive at decisions about resources that will accu-
rately reflect society.  The notion that owner decision makers are not
unfettered in their decision-making41 but rather have social responsi-
bilities that require them to function in ways that appreciate that their
actions affect others by imposing harms and benefits, reveals the pro-
gressive strands of his work.42  Gerhart’s dedication to crafting a
means to insert others into the calculus of the decision-making process
is impressive.  This attention to others and their role in constructing
the property system is connected to the concept of reflection.  If one is
making the claim that the system reflects the values of the community,
as Gerhart does, then one needs to identify how owners and non-own-
ers influence the system.  Further, if one is operating in the deontic
realm of prescribing the appropriate conduct of individuals regarding
their distribution and redistribution of resources within society, one
needs to ensure adherence to the recommendations advanced.  Ger-
hart proposes a vehicle to accomplish these goals.  This Section ex-
plores whether the principles and mechanisms identified achieve
Gerhart’s objective of producing better decisions that are more reflec-
tive of society.
First, however, it is necessary to explain the concept of reflection
and its relationship to Gerhart’s vision of property.  Reflection en-
compasses the two actions of mirroring43 and thinking.44  Both ideas
are at work in Gerhart’s definition of a legal system:
40. See GERHART, supra note 1, at 46 (commenting that his theory “is unique in
putting the concept of owner as constrained decision maker at the heart of a theory of
property”); Id.
41. See id. at 62 (stating owners are “constrained” decision makers); Id. (explain-
ing that, “an owner’s decisions are constrained because the owner must act as the
owner would if the owner accounted appropriately for the social values implicated by
her decision.”).
42. There are, however, clear differences between Gerhart’s theories and the pro-
gressive property law camp. Notably, Gerhart’s view of “rights and responsibilities
over resources flow[ing] from a single set of values” differs from the progressive view
which recognizes competing “plural and incommensurable” values within property
systems. See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Pen˜laver, Joseph William Singer, and
Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, see also Gregory S. Alex-
ander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, Vol. 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 745–820; GERHART, supra note 1, at 5.
43. Reflection may be defined as the “image given back by a reflecting surface”
that shows “the effect, existence, or character of something else.” Reflection, MER-
RIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
reflection.
44. Reflection is also defined as “a thought, idea, or opinion formed or a remark
made as a result of meditation.” Reflection, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTION-
ARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reflection.
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A system of law is a reflection of the values a society uses and ex-
pects an individual to use, to make judgments about which of vari-
ous positions the law might take on issues it confronts.45
The framework Gerhart proposes for making decisions that will be
reflective of society’s values includes two germane constructs, the
equality principle, and the veil of ignorance.  The ideal decision maker
must act in accordance with the equality principle,46 which means that,
“in all dealings between individuals or between individuals and the
state, each individual is entitled to respect equal to the respect given
to every other individual.”47  This principle is critical in challenging
hierarchies and belief systems that advocate assigning individuals vari-
ous socioeconomic roles.  The equality principle advances the idea
that all humans are on an equal plane and deserving of dignity and
mutual respect.48  By including the principle within the decision-mak-
ing structure, Gerhart moves closer to the goal of making the system
reflective of society’s values, in that the equality principle supports the
idea that the differing interests of all members of society are worthy of
consideration regardless of socioeconomic position.49  However, the
principle is limited in what it can accomplish.  Applying the equality
principle is likely to result in a stalemate with the bias tilting in favor
of the status quo.  At some point, the individual or governmental en-
tity following the rule must make decisions about the use of resources
and whether ownership rights will be recognized.  According equal re-
spect to positions and interests does not guarantee that the ultimate
decisions emerging from the process will be any different from those
that do not adhere to the equality principle.  The status quo property
owner may remain in place opting to use his property in a way that
deprives others of benefits after he engages in the exercise of applying
the equality principle.  For example, notwithstanding property law’s
maxim for owners to use their property in a way so as not to harm
others (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas), property owners do harm
others50 and, sometimes, the harm inflicted is intentional.51
45. GERHART, supra note 1, at 8.
46. Id. at 20 (“The foundational principle animating the theory here, as is true for
most moral theory,[ ] is the principle of equal freedom. . ..”) (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 20.
48. Id. at 20–21.
49. Id. at 156.
50. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: Finding Common Ground on
the Ownership of Land 22 (2009) (commenting on the changing views of the do-no-
harm maxim).
51. Id. Take for example, the construction of the “middle finger” buildings in
Washington, D.C.; see Walter Hickey, D.C. Homeowner Turns House into a Giant
Middle Finger Pointed Straight at the Government, in BUS. INSIDER, (Mar. 29, 2013
1:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/middle-finger-dc-capitol-2013-3. These
structures depart from the height levels of the other buildings on their block, protrud-
ing upward in a manner that from a distance resembles a middle finger being raised
from a closed fist. The buildings are also referred to as “pop-up” housing. In addition
to the pop-up building featured in Hickey’s article, there are apparently other similar
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In recognizing that more is required to achieve proper “other-re-
garding”52 decision-making, Gerhart relies upon the veil of ignorance,
which is a construct prevalent in the work of legal philosopher John
Rawls.53  Gerhart introduces this apparatus as a means to both ensure
equality and to think about the process of decision-making.54  He
writes:
Behind the veil of ignorance, each individual is required to reason
toward a decision without knowing how he or she will be affected
by the decision; each individual will therefore assign the burdens
and benefits of the decision using neutral values that are common to
the community and eschewing values that advance only an individ-
ual’s personal agenda.  The resulting decision will be one that the
community as a whole would endorse and that we can view to be
both fair and efficient.55
There is tremendous value in conceptualizing decision-making in this
way.  In the theoretical realm, it allows for the isolation of a critical
part (i.e. one’s identity) that shapes the process of analyzing a ques-
tion concerning resources and reaching a decision.  This apparatus
also allows for the clarification of different sources that individuals
may draw from when engaged in the act of decision-making.  It forces
the decision maker to think about the act of rendering a decision.
This meta-exercise of thinking about thinking is essential for Gerhart,
as well, in that it allows him to identify and propose recommendations
for changing the owner decision-making process to improve that pro-
cess so that society will accept those decisions because they encom-
pass varied interests rather than just the decision maker’s.  Gerhart
argues that if decisions are made conforming to the proposed para-
digm, they will have legitimacy; they will be “socially-recognized” to
use his terminology. Notwithstanding the utility of the veil mecha-
nism, there is a dichotomy between theory and reality.  From a practi-
developments springing up in D.C., See Kriston Capps, Income Inequality Lurks Be-
neath D.C.’s ‘Pop-Up’ Housing Debate, CITYLAB (July 2, 2014), http://
www.citylab.com/housing/2014/07/income-inequality-lurks-beneath-dcs-pop-up-
housing-debate/373804/.  Developers are making money by taking advantage of
vertical space regardless of whether their choices obstruct the views of others or
detract from the positive aesthetic aspects of a neighborhood, arguably causing
economic harm to neighbors.
52. GERHART, supra note 1, at 54, 55 (defining “other-regarding” as “a form of
rational decision making” involving “incorporat[ing] the well-being of others” into
one’s decision making).
53. Id. at 21, n.44.
54. Gerhart describes the veil of ignorance as:
“[A] thought experiment that allows an individual to reason about the ap-
propriate way to make a decision (and the appropriate decision to make)
when the individual must integrate her self-regarding and her other-regard-
ing obligations.”
Id. at 154.
55. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
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cal standpoint, it is doubtful that an individual could suspend
knowledge regarding his “status”56 in the outcome of the decision.
It is necessary to explore how the veil of ignorance would operate in
order to assess whether it leads to the decision maker arriving at
“fairer” decisions—meaning that they consider a broader range of ef-
fects, interests, and outcomes—than if the decision maker was left to
his own devices to produce self-interested decisions.57  The application
of the construct would probably result in a decision maker asking at
least one additional question than he might have asked otherwise.
Outside of Gerhart’s paradigm the decision maker would likely ask:
How will this decision affect me?  The decision maker’s evaluation of
the rule or law proposed would flow from that perspective.  With the
veil of ignorance applied, the decision maker would probably ask the
two questions: How would this decision affect me if I were X?  How
would this decision affect me if I were Y?  The “I” can be excised
from the questions to ask: How would the decision affect X and Y?
This result is in keeping with the goals of the book to move in the
direction of making decisions that properly consider others.  However,
to pose appropriate questions about the issue being decided, the deci-
sion maker has to draw upon aspects of his identity, which include his
store of knowledge from his life experience.  There are questions that
may interfere with complying with the requirement that the decision
maker suspend knowledge of his status.  For example, questions such
as: How does the decision maker know the things he knows?  How
does he understand the information that he has been exposed to?
Even if those questions do not arise, in answering the first two queries
posed regarding the effect of a certain decision if one is X as opposed
to Y, there are other influences that have the potential to undermine
the objectivity the exercise is intended to achieve.
If you are ignorant about your status in the matter being consid-
ered, then you will need to turn to what you do know to make your
decision. Gerhart proposes that decision makers will turn to “values
that are common to the community.”58  The decision maker may draw
from, for example, religious values, patriotic values that have been
inculcated as part of one’s education, democratic values, cultural val-
ues, and family values.  Gerhart describes these values as being “neu-
tral” because they are shared in common and because they do not
56. Id. at 156 (defining “status” as a designation that concerns “the socioeconomic
position of the decision maker and identifies factors that would allow the decision
maker to either gain or lose from the decision.”).
57. Presumably, everyone has an opportunity to make decisions. That is, all indi-
viduals within society would have the opportunity to be in the decision maker role
drawing upon the scheme that Gerhart’s theory develops. Perhaps, the equality prin-
ciple accomplishes that moment of conferring upon everyone decision-making pow-
ers. If not, then any inequities of the existing property system are incorporated into
Gerhart’s model.
58. GERHART, supra note 1, at 21.
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focus solely on a self-interested decision maker.  In contrast to Ger-
hart’s characterization, this Article argues that commonality is not the
same as neutrality.  The prevalence of certain societal values does not
make them neutral.  As an individual considers these values, he will
be drawing upon his experience.  His experience tells him something
about himself and his identity.  Knowledge creeps into the framework.
The veil of ignorance becomes suspect as a neutral mechanism be-
cause the individual will be relying upon facets of his identity and ex-
perience in order to decide. The decision maker must assume the
difficult position of being disinterested enough to make the decision
and engaged enough to know society’s values.  Despite the concerns,
this Essay agrees that if all the aforementioned considerations are
taken into account the resulting process is likely to be more compre-
hensive than it would have been without the veil of ignorance.  It
makes sense that a decision maker will be more careful and thoughtful
in his decisions if he is unsure whether he will suffer the harsh
consequences.
A concrete example brings to light other positives associated with
the veil of ignorance and another limitation.  Assume that the decision
maker must decide whether to vote for a proposed regulation that
would permit farmers in a certain geographic region to expand their
crops to include medical marijuana.  The decision maker is a farmer
who would benefit from the change.  Behind the veil of ignorance, the
decision maker does not know whether he is: (1) a farmer seeking the
change; (2) an environmentalist who is concerned about the negative
impact a marijuana crop will have on fish, wildlife, and plants; (3) a
legislator with a constituency that is divided on the issue; (4) a patient
who would benefit from the availability of medical marijuana within
the region; (5) a parent who does not want the state to host this kind
of agriculture; or (6) a neighboring homeowner who is concerned that
some of the chemicals used in cultivating the crop might cause damage
to his property.  Since the decision maker does not know who he is
and how a “yes” or “no” vote will impact him, he should ask numer-
ous questions regarding the consequences of voting in a particular
way.  In order to be able to ask the right questions, the decision maker
has to either have broad knowledge about the interests involved or
have those interests and consequences presented to him.  There is a
danger that if the decision maker is not well-versed in matters con-
cerning medical marijuana crops or if some interests are not presented
to him, then the decision will not be reflective of all of society’s values.
The decision maker will consider some of the values but the disen-
franchised interests will not be taken into account.  Consequently, the
resulting marginalized interests will raise questions about the fairness
of the decision and the process.
Social values and their place in Gerhart’s decision-making frame-
work merit further attention.  Gerhart imposes the limitation that the
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reasoning that occurs behind the veil of ignorance “requires an assess-
ment of how the community is likely to view the relative value of the
freedom from harm that must be allocated.”59  The resort back to
prevalent values threatens to undermine one of the main objectives of
the book, which is to promote a theory of “responsibility”60 that will
lead to decisions “that the community as a whole would endorse and
that we can view to be both fair and efficient.”61  The root of the con-
cern raised in this Section is the theory’s reference to social values,
notwithstanding the possibility that they are marked by inequities, as
the ultimate check on whether the decision maker has determined the
apt contours of the exchange, weighed all of the significant factors,
and properly assessed the benefits and burdens. This Article highlights
the theory’s blind spots to moments of resistance and inequalities that
are muted or disregarded altogether by the system. Gerhart’s system
aims to exclude the potential for bias with the veil of ignorance and
the equal freedom principle but then enfolds the potential for bias
back into the model when he includes the values of society, which will
reflect the favored interests and biases of people.62
V. THE INSISTENCE ON MORALITY
This Section explores the use of the term “morality” and the pur-
poses it serves in Gerhart’s system. Gerhart characterizes his theory as
“both descriptive and justificatory.”63  The justificatory elements are
apparent when he discusses how decisions that conform to his para-
digm should be treated. He asserts that those decisions “are entitled
to be called moral.”64  Further, he argues that, “a right [is] a claim that
others have a moral obligation to respect, and social recognition pro-
vides the moral basis for respecting property rights.”65  This formula-
tion is restrictive and binding in that those who participate in a legal
system are compelled to adhere to the prevailing structure of social
values or risk being labeled as operating outside the moral realm.
Gerhart defines moral decision-making in the property realm in sev-
eral ways.  At the core is the requisite to make decisions that are in
accordance with society’s values, meaning that the decisions should
59. Id. at 157.
60. Id. at 3–7.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 4 (“The unification of rights and responsibilities requires a theory that
justifies both the existence and the scope of rights, so that rights and their limitations
can be understood to emanate from a single set of values.”) (emphasis added).
63. GERHART, supra note 1, at 6.
64. Id. at 57 (“From behind the veil of ignorance, decisions will have the kind of
neutrality, and will be grounded on social values concerning the well-being of inter-
acting individuals, that non-interested decision makers would take into account; those
decisions are entitled to be called moral.”).
65. Id. at 50.
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“appropriately assign benefits and burdens,”66 as determined by soci-
ety.67 Morality is defined by society.  Once moral rules are deter-
mined, individuals have an obligation to obey them. The comfort level
an individual may have with this statement is likely to vary depending
upon whether the person agrees with what society has decided. From
this perspective, the term morality appears to serve the protective
function of maintaining the status quo.
Gerhart’s concept of “morality” has grounding in the philosophical
realm.  In philosophy, morality refers to “some codes of conduct put
forward by society” or refers “to a code of conduct that, given speci-
fied conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.”68  It is
worth noting that these definitions do not address the substance of the
code of conduct that emerges, which may be profoundly disturbing in
terms of how individuals are treated (i.e. how they are expected to
live, and what resources they have available to them).  To the extent
that Gerhart is focused on other-regarding behavior and the equality
principle, he is also accessing another meaning of “morality.”  The
other meaning concerns the connotation of morality as being fair, just,
and good.69  But what society decides upon for its values may not be
fair, just, or good.  Here, it is important to recognize that one can take
different philosophical approaches to rights and morality.70  One ap-
proach envisions rights and values as universals that are inviolable and
normatives for all humankind.71  Another approach is relativist and
views questions of moral rightness, goodness, and fairness in fluctua-
tion and open to determination by different societies.72  Gerhart’s the-
ory evidences both approaches.  On the one hand, it presents equal
66. Gerhart states that: “In private law, each decision about property must appro-
priately assign the burdens and benefits of the decision in light of the need to respect
the equality of all individuals.” Id. at 254.
67. Gerhart maintains that “property rights arise and are worthy of moral respect,
because they follow the terms under which the community recognizes claims over
resources.” Id. at 48. The values that serve as the measure of whether decisions are
moral arise from society. Id. at 251 (“[Social Recognition] is centered on the social
values that develop over time from countless interactions of individuals over claims
about how resources ought to be used and over the equitable division of burdens and
benefits within the society.”).
68. The Definition of Morality, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, avail-
able at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/ (last updated May 14,
2011).
69. Morality, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(5th ed. 2011) (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co.), available at http://
www.thefreedictionary.com/morality. (“The quality of being in accord with standards
of right or good conduct.”).
70. See generally Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations, THE UNIV. OF
OXFORD FACULTY OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, March 2007,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999874. (discussing the difficulties of defining
universal human rights and creating a framework for identification).
71. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 68.
72. Id.; see entry by Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, and
Michael J. Meyer on “ethical relativism”:
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freedom and the maxim “treat others as you wish them to treat
you,”73 expressed through the veil of ignorance, as universals to which
the ideal decision maker must adhere.  On the other hand, the theory
requires deference to the values that society decides.74
Even though Gerhart builds in conditions concerning equal free-
dom75 and the importance of being mindful of the well-being of
others, the question of what is “appropriate” ultimately comes down
to what the community thinks (or has decided) is appropriate.76  Ger-
hart’s framework does not allow for nonviolent disruptive protests of
property systems that challenge the designations of owners and non-
owners and the assignments of benefits and burdens on the basis that
the distributions are inequitable.  According to Gerhart’s theory, indi-
viduals who assert through civil disobedience a right to housing,
grounded in the notion that this is a universal human right, risk having
their claim labeled as immoral because it is outside the scope of recog-
nizable rights as defined by their community.  If society views the
claim as immoral, not only will it lack legitimacy and have little chance
of succeeding, those presenting the claim will have the label of immo-
rality reflected back on them. This Article differs from Gerhart’s ap-
proach regarding the degree of control he cedes to society in
promoting the social cooperativeness component of his theory. While
it is permissible for the decision maker to take into account prevailing
social values, it is acceptable, and at times necessary, to reach deci-
sions that conflict with or challenge those values.
VI. CONCLUSION
Gerhart’s decision-making paradigm, which insists on social respon-
sibility and equal freedom, is a valuable contribution to the field. His
“Ethical relativism is the theory that holds that morality is relative to the
norms of one’s culture. That is, whether an action is right or wrong depends
on the moral norms of the society in which it is practiced. The same action
may be morally right in one society but be morally wrong in another. For the
ethical relativist, there are no universal moral standards—standards that can
be universally applied to all peoples at all times. The only moral standards
against which a society’s practices can be judged are its own. If ethical rela-
tivism is correct, there can be no common framework for resolving moral
disputes or for reaching agreement on ethical matters among members of
different societies.”
Manuel Velasquez et al., Ethical Relativism, SANTA CLARA UNIV., http://
www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/ethicalrelativism.html#sthash.Rtsfi1Oq.dpuf.
73. GERHART, supra note 1, at 21, n.45.
74. Id. at 155, n.38, (commenting that “[t]he implementation of the universal re-
quirements of a moral decision will vary with the values that are taken into account in
making the decision and will therefore result in a wide variety of social systems, each
of which is considered by its participants, to be moral”).
75. Id. at 20 (“This is the obligation of equal treatment of the dignity and self-rule
of every individual.”).
76. See id. at 157 (stating that the decision maker “must resort to values that are
commonly used in the community for making decisions of that kind.”).
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theory recognizes the mutually reinforcing relationships between indi-
viduals and the systems in which they live.  Yet, there are significant
limitations to the framework he proposes. An examination of the ori-
gins of property systems is critical for understanding them and for
generating theories about their meaning and nature.  By omitting this
aspect from the narrative, one cannot fully account for the persistent
role of force in maintaining a legal system or do justice to those who
are resistant to prevailing values and decisions that, from alternative
vantage points (e.g., universal human rights), are objectionable.
